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EXPTAITATORY STATEMENT
A. Introduction
1 - Pursuant to Article 206b of the Treaty estabtishing the European
Economic Community, the European Parliament, on a reconmendation from
the council which decides by a gualified .rajority, gives a discharge to
the commission in respect of the implementation of ttre budget.. Article
85 of the Financial Regulation of 2L Decedber 1977 applicable to the
general budget of the European Communities gives further details of
provision : The thir<l subparagraph tJrereof states : '1[he Institutions
shall take aII appropriate steps to take act,ion on the connents
appearing in the decisions giving discharge.' It. is the CornmittLe bn
Budgetary Control which is reeponsible for preparing the discharge
decisions and the accompanying comments.
2. The discharge procedure, and ind.eed tJre activities of the Committee
on Budgetary Control in general, probably seem to be almpst an occult
\
science to many Menbersof the European Parliament. Iqany at Ieast feel
that they are purely technical matters which are therefore justifiably
dealt with discreetly removed from the gaze of the public and virtually
unnoticed even by the majority of lvlembers.
3. ' However, this approach is clearly misguided. The preparation of
the discharge procedure in comnittee does admittedly require a meticulous
analysis of the financial activities of the institutions in all their
specialized technical detailsand minute ramifications. However, this
technical work is aII directed towards single object,ive, which is the
final politicaL assessment of the Commission's activities during the
financial year in guestion. The proposed decisions on the discharge and
accompanying motion for a resolution which are subruitted to the plenary
represent an invitation to the whole Parliament to undertake this
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definitive assessment ad to grant or refuse a digcharge to the Commission
in respect of the work of the yoar under L-olrsiderdtit>n.
It should not be thought that, since this assessmenL relates initiatly
to a financial year which has already closed, the discharge procedure
is of pureLy historical interest. Article 85 of the Financial Regulation,
which requires the institutions to take practical measurea in tlB light
of the comments contained in the discharge deciEions, makes it guite
clear that the discharge procedure ie indeed of inmediate importance for
the future developnent of the Connunity and its organs. In this sense
the exercise by Parlianent of its discharge powers is a matter of high
politics which is central to Parliament's rights, especially eince,
contrary to the procedure for the adoption of the budget, Parl-iament
has sole decision-naking pow€rs in this field.
4. Ihe reduced porers that Parliament would possess if its budgetary
powers were not backed up by the powers relating to the discharge clearly
illustrate t]re fact that value of the latter cannot be overestimated.
5. In the debates on the 1979 budget (and on subsequent budgets) the
European Parliament, to a gr€ater extent than in previous years, regarded
the Cornmunity budget as a political instrument to be used to promote
integration in the Conmunity and as a pnctical political programroe for
the financial year in guestion. Wtrereas under the Council's influence
tlre objectives of prevlous comnunity budgets had been confined to draw-
ing up accounts for tlp financial implications of decisions taken else-
where, ln 1979 Parliament gave prlority to using the budgret as aractive
instrunent of integration policy and giving it an independent role in
the shaping of the economy of tfie Conrnunity and of the l,lember States.
6. fhe attempts by the Finance Ministers and t'linisters for Economic
Affairs to develop an independent Comnunity economic policy in order
to solve, jointly or at leaEt by mutual agreement, the structural
probrems facing al-I the lrtember states, had not got beyond ttre initail
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stages. Parriament therefore sought to use the appropriations in the
1979 buclget to give fresh impetus to these ef forts. In 1978 the Ivlember
states were faced with the increasingry pressing probrems of growing
unemployment. rn order to sorve these probrems, parriament attached
particular importance during the budget procedure to an increase in the
regources allocated to the social Fund, with the specific aim of com-
batting unerylo1znent, above all among particularly vulnerable sections
of the population, such as lromen and young peopre. similar mot,ives
lay behind the attempt to increase the arlocation to the Regional
Fund with a view to introducing structural improvements in the less
prosperous regions which were particularly hard hit by unefiployment.
Parliament likewise souEtht to promote industrial policy in order to aI-
leviate tlte consequences of structural crises in the worst-hit sectors
and, if possible, to eliminate the actuar causes of these crises.
7. The European Parl-iament also strove to establish a more concentrated
system of community financing in order to step up integrated measures.
rn the budget debates parriament was crearry concerned with the
fundamentar guestion as to the rore a community budget can reasonabry
be expected to fuIfil. Of prime importance in this connection $ras the
recognition that the Comnunity's activities should be concentrated in
these areas where the l,lember States alone cannot intervene or cannot
do so efficiently, or where comnunity action can achieve the desired
rosult on the whole more cheapry, econornically and rationarly thah
action taken by ttre individual l{ember States.
8. rn itE capacity as an arm of the budgetary authority parriament
viewed the 1979 budget debates as a furtirer refrection of the deter-
mination to establish a practical political action prograrnme for 1979.
&leasures recognized as appropriate and necessary were to be implemented
not at some unspecified point in the future but during the year for
which tle rerevant appropriations hrere entered in the 1979 budget.
In its resolution on the draft budget for L979 parliament stated that
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the imprenentation of thE budget aE an instrument of community structurar
poJ-icy should concEtrate on the following priorities :
- social Fund: fight against unempl0lment a.ong young peopre and women
- Regional Fund, including non-quota section appropriations
- agricultural structures
- transport infrastructure
- marlne policy
- energ[y policy: nely energy soulces _ energ]f savings
- industrial policy
- environmental protection
- research
- education
- development aid.
9. Although the European parliament did not succeed, either in 1979
or in subsequent years, in gaining fulr recognition for its views in
the budget as finally adopted, on the wtrole it nanaged to enforce its
political will to a coneiderable ext€nt.
10' rf Parliament dld not possess these powers relating to the discharge
its politicar wirr courd simpry be ignored during the financiar year by
the council and commission, either individuarly or in collaboration.
As in the past the budget could simply be seen as the transcription into
the acccunts of policies which would be decided elsewhere and in any event
not in conjunction wittr the budget.
11. rf it were not for parriament,s power to grant a discharge, it wanld
be all too easy for the comnissr.on to avoid rmplementing parriament,s
wishes by asserting that the budget is not regally binding, rnerery
represents a series of statenents of intent in vo,,ing no obligation, and,
in any event, requires for its implementation supprementary political
decisions by the Council.
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L2. Hdever, this View of the legal situation(which, in some sectors
at least, is unfortunately still maintained by. the Commission)
clearly conflicte witlt the fact that Farliament, and Partianent alone
has the right,under the discharge procedure,to make a political
aesessnent of the implementation of the budget. It is no'coincidence
\
tlrat Parliament's povlers in respect of the discharge have developed
as its budgetay powerE have been extended. Article 2O6b of the Treaty
establishing the European Econonic Community, which gives Parlianent
sole porer to grant the discharge, t{as not inserted until provisions
were introduced granting Parliarnent its existing powers in respect of
tl:e procedure for adopting the hadget. Etris too exphasizes the fact
that the powers rel-ating to the discharge constitute a necessary and
logical extenEion of tlle European Parlia.ment's budgetary pdrerg.
13. Xts reEponsibility for the discharge naturally implies that
Parriament aLso has the possibility of refusing to grant the discharge.
1[he consequences of such a refusal ar€ not explieitly dealt with in the
Ereatles. In political terms, however, a decision by Parliament refusing
to grant a discharge wculd amount to a vote of censure on the Commission.
lfhie was the logical conclusion reached by ![r Tugendhat t'tember of the
comission, in his statementto the European parriament on z Jury l97z
tlat : 'Such a refusal would hence be extremely serious; the CornmLsELon
thus censured would, I think, have to be replaced.'
L4. rn accordance with Articre 144 of EEC rieaty, the procedure under
which the Europ€an Parliament can pass a motion of censure on the Commission
and oblige it to resigri is subject to special conditions. rn particular,
a certain period nust elapse before the vote on the mot.Lon which, for
adoption, requires a doubre quorun. rhese speciar conditione would of
courae not be met if Parlianent were to deeide by a simple majority
( which is Eufficient) to refuse'to grant a discharge to the Commission,
or if a notion granting such a discharge did not obtain the required
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siuple majority in ttre plenary. Such a decision, though taken only
by a simplenajority of Parliament, sould nevertheless have far-reaching
conaequences. If the Cornnission did not resign of its own accord, in
line with !!r TuEendlat's interpretation, tllis would certainly constitute
sufficient grounds for tabling a notion of censure pursuant to Article
L44. In thig connection, it should make n6 difference wheuher the
Connission in office at the time of the discharge procedure was also
the body responsible for implementing the budget in guestion.
Although its membership changes, the continuity of the Commission as an
institution should be the nain factor.
15. But even a granted discharge has implications for t}re Commission.
Under Article 85 of the Financial Regulation the European Parliament's
comnents in its resolution on the discharge decisions are binding on the
institutiong, and in particular on the Commission. lltre CommlEsion.must
conEeguently act on ParlLament's comnents either by the deadline
explicitly laid down in the resolution or at least within a reasonable
period. If it fails to do so, Parlianent inevitably has to clecide
whether to table a motion of ceure pursuant to Article I44 of the
Treaty in view of the failure to take account of its wishes as expres-
sed in the resoLution
16. The European Parliamentts comnents in the reeolution attached to
the diecharge decisions should therefore be seen principalLy as inEtruct-
ions in the technicar Eense, which are to be carried out by the commis-
sion by the given deadline or within a reasonable period.
Explanation of the individual sectionE and trnragraphs of the
notion for a resolution
L7. The folloring sets out briefly the considerations which led the
Conmittee on Budgetary Control to put fomard the proposals ontained in
B.
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the motion for a resolution. Particular reference is made to those
points which caused controversy in the committee and in these cases the
minority opinion is also given.
1. Ttre role of the court of Auditors in the diEcharqe procedure
lg. The preparation of the discharge procedure is based on the annual
report of the European Court of Auditors (paragraPh 1). Unfoqtunately,
the committee again this year had very litt1e time in which to conpl-ete
its work, whiih therefore considerably less thorough than it might be.
Paragraph 3 is designed to prevent a recurrence of this Utfortunate
state of affairs. It would be a considerable help if ttre Committee on
Budgetary Control, on behalf of Parliament, could begin its preparatory
work in September instead of at the earliest in December as in the past.
Some Members feared that ttre committee's objectivity might be jeopardized
if accor:nt were taken initially of tre Court of Auditors' remarks alone
without the replies of the institutions. Hor'rever, the majority felt that
the committee members were sufficiently reasonable and impartial to be
able to assess these replies objectively and in fuII, even if they did
not become available until after the Court of Auditors' comments.
19. Not for the first time a dispute arose between the EuroPean Court
of Auditors and the Comnission as to whether the Court was entitled to
add comnents to ttre replies of the institutions to its initial remarks.
An ovenrhelming majority of the Committee on Btdgetary Control feel
that the legat point of view put forward by the Court of Auditors in this
connection is correct trd that its comments are of val-ue. In any event
it is Parliament, and not either of these two institutions, that has
tlre final work in the discharge procedure. Since ttris has been a point
of contention for years, it is felt that the majority opinion in the
committee should be explicitly set out in paragraph 2.
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rr- Compliance with the budqetarv princinles
20. The problem of tranefers of appropriations, which undermine the
principles of the annuality and specificity of the budget, has stll}
not been satiEfactorily solved.
2L. In particular, the principle of annuality was bLatantly flouted in
1979 when, in December of that year, an amount 203.5mEIB in the EAGGF,
Guarantee Section, waE spent contrary to express provisionE and rrithout
budgetary authorization. It was then charged to the 1980 budget,
although, in accordance with the Financial Regulation and in particular
Article 98 thereof, it should clearly have been charged to the 1979
budget.
22. The European Court of Audltors recormrended Parliament to insist
that this amount be re-entered as expenditure in the revenue and
expenditure account and th6 balance sheet for ttre ftnanclal year ending
31 Decenber L979-
23. The question as to whether Parliarnent should act on the Court's
recommendation was throughout strongly disputed in the Comruittee on
Budgetary Control. Moreover, the Commission also resisted thiE demand
to the very last. lrtre following paragraS*rs briefly set out the
argu.ments put forsrard by those who opposed the recomrnendation and
explain why they are fallacious.
24. Firstry, iL was maintained that reelassification wourd affect
the maximum rate of increase referred to in Articre 203 (9) of the EEC
Treaty, both for 1980 and for subsequent years. This is incorrect,
sj.nce it would affect onry compulsory, not non-couqgulsoryrexpenditure.
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25. Secondly, it was pointed out that if the amount of 203.5 m EIJA was
tranderred to the 1979 accounts the percentage rate forming ttre basis
of assessment of value added tax, which had been fixed for 1980 would
have to be changed. Ttris argu.ment is likewise invalid,since the amount,
in question would disappear from both the expenditure and revenue sides
of one set of accounts and be entered on both sides of the other set.
val-ue added tax is used.to cover the shortfall in ttre Community,s orrn
resources which reeults when total expenditure is set against the other
own resources (customs duties, agricultural leviesr ottrer revenue).
The fact that the anount of 203.5m ELIA was charged not to the 1979 but
to the 1980 accounts automatically resulted in a corresponding increase
in the surplus for 1979. Ihe correction proposed by the Court of
Auditors would thus mean that the amount in quest,ion wourd disappear
fron both the er<penditure and ttre revenue sides of the 1990 accounts,
since the surplua revenue from 1979 would be reduced by a corresponding
Eun. 1[tre considerable disparity between ot]rer own resources ( excluding
vAT rev6nue) and expenditure, whidr is to be made good from VAf revenue,
would thus be totally unaffected by the reclassification. The Cornmission
was unable to substantiate its claim that this manoeuvre would be
expensive and invorve a (D nsiderabre amount of work. The court of
Auditors maintained, and this has not been contradicted, that the
operation waa a simple and straightfonuard one.
26. Ttre Comnission also asserted ttrat t]le accounts could be corrected
only if the 1980 budget was modified or if a new supplementary or amend-
ing budget was subsequently adopted. [his argument is also without
foundation. By its very nature each budget is no nore that a preview,
a rough estimate. l{trat happens in the course of 6 financial year wit}r
regard to botlt revenue and expenditure never accords exactly ryith what(
is entered in tle budget. rf for example at the end of the financial
year it €nerges that revenue rras higher or expenditure lcnrer than
provided for in the budget, ffr is produces a surprus whieh is carried
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over to the follohring year. If the reverse happens, a deficit is pro-
duced which is likewise carried over into the following year, this time
on the expenditure side. A situation in whidt, as in the case in
question, expenditure in a financial year exceeds the amourt authorized
in the budget, is of course to be strongly dlsqpproved and deeply regret-
ted. Eowever, this error cannot be correcEed by a further error which
also falsifies the accourt. s. Quite apart from the guestion as to
sihether, in any case, a supplementary or amending budget can be produced
for a financial year which has already closed (the majority of tlte Com-
mittee on Budgetary control onsider this to be impossible), the pre-
paration of corrected accounts in no way PresuPposes a modification to
the budget. The budget represents an estimate of what 'ought' to happen,
while the accounts refLect rihat actually does happen, and the trvo do
not necessarily agree. Deviatlons from what 'ought' to happen regularly
occur, although the caee involved here, ttrat is, witlt expenditure exceed
the budgetary authorization, is fortunately exceptlonal. Ho,eever, even
this exceptional case calls simplybr the accounts to be corrected
aecordingty and not for any anendment to the'initial estinate as
set out in the budget. If thie was so, every deviation for example
the failure to spend some or all of the money avallable in the
budget. This of course does rot happen. Srch cases merely affect the
accounts, where tltey are reflected accurately. The Court of Auditors
rightly criticized ttre fact that the 1979 accounts are incorrect
since they do not include the additional expenditure of 203.5m EUA
ftris anount should be entered on the expenditure side of the 1979
accounts with a corresponding reductLon in the surplus for that
year. The relevant c-orrections should then be made to the accounts
for the 1980 financial year : expendLture is to be reduced by 203.5 m
EIB, as is revenue, since the surplus carried over from 1979, entered
under revenue, wilL be reduced by the same amount.
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27. Finally, the Commission also obJected that the inclusion of this amount
in the !9'19 accounts, (an incorrect operation, in the view of the Court of
Audltors and a maJority of the Comnlttee on Budgetary contrel which should be
rectified), had been sanctioned by the budgetary authority when the latter
establlshed the surolus carrled forward from 1979 to 1980, includlng the 2O3.5 m EUA
in questlon, ln the flrst and second supplementary and amending budgets for
1980 adopted on 20 November and 23 Decenber respectively. There are two
replles to thls: 1. Even the supplementary and amending budgets are no
more than estimates. Their adoptlon on false assumptlons ls regrettable but
cannot be allOwed to sanction accounts dravrn up earller in error.
2. The rrosltion of the European Parll-ament as discharge authority would be
completeJ-y undermlned if the posslbillty existed of preemptlng the discharge
declsion by budgetary decisions taken by the European Parliament as a part
of the budgetary authorlty. As dlseharge authority the European Parllament
must be free to declde whether the accounts of the budgetary year under
scrutlny have been conducted correctly and whether, and possibly ho whilt
extent, the Comnission can be granted a dlscharge.
28. To sum un the cogltlon wlth regard to this problem, a majorlty of the
members of the Committee on Budgetary Control consider that the
recomrnendatlon of the Court of Audltore should be respected and that a
dlscharge can only be glven lf the Ermouht of 203.5 m EUA Is included in
the 1979 exgendlture. Accordlngly thls amount, to be preeise
2O3,483t472.3 EUA, has been entered on the expenditure side in the second
nrooosed dlscharge declsion, on page 8 of the draft report. The Commisslon
ls thus asked, !n paragrarrh 11 of the motion for a resolutlon, to accePt
the consequences of the dlscharge decislon and to put down the fuII amount
to the L979 accounts and at the same tine to correct the accounts for the
1-979 surplus accordlngly.
29. The budget of the European Parllament also incl-udes a transfer of
2.68L m EUA f,rom 1979 to 1980 ln respect of whlch not all thetery
orecise dlsSlosltlons of the Flnancla1 Regulatlon were sbserved on all points -
parliament was of course acting ln good falth at the time, referring to an
internal arrangement with the Councll. However, a majorlty of the
Com$lttee on Budgetary Control belleve that the nrovlsions of the
Flnanclal Regulation should be very strictJ-y observed by all the
lnstltutlons, includlng the European Parliament, as Parl-lament wouLd
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otherwise be liable to sacrifice the authorlty whieh it requires when it
demands that other lnstltutLons should be Strict ln thls observatlon of
regulations. In thls case the accounts have already been corrected as
desired and the instltutions concerned have deelared, that the provlslons
w111 be strictly complied wlth in the future.
30. A problen whlch has been dlscussed repeatedly for years ls one whlch
arlses from the fact that, although the European Parlianent has budgetary
powers, 1t has no real leglslatlve pohrers. This 1s relativery
unproblematlcal when the Councll enacts legislatlon wlth flnanclal
lmpllcatlons, even agalnst the w111 of Parllament: in such cases these
comtrltments can and (as the exrendlture concerned 1s compulsory) must be
consLdered during the budget deliberatlons. But what happens when Lhe
ParlLament, as Dart of the budgetary authortty (and partteularly ln respect
of non-comrrulsory exnendlture), forces through budget declsions in the
absence of any correspondlng leglslatlve declsions on the way in whlch the
money ls to be utillsed? Here Daragraph 14 of the motlon for a resol-utlon
polnts out that the under-utlllsatlon of resources tn those areas to which
Parllament attached particular tmportance ln lts amendments to the 1979
budlget ls due not least to the fact that the CommlsEion eontlnues to
refuse to recognlse the budget ln every case aE an adequate basls for the
utillsation of arroroprlatlons. Concrete examples of this are energy pollcy
(see also paragraph 49) and flnanclal qnd technieal asslstance fcr non-
asscciated develonlng countries (see also paraqraph 5g).
31. Taken to extremes, contlnuatlon of this praetlce eould totarry
,rrlertnind the budgetary povrers of the European parllament ln the area of
non-(jomr.)ulsory exr:endlture whlch Is so lmoortant to it. What use would
lrudget declslons of the Euronean Parliament be lf the Councll refused or
faIled to Dass suoplementlng leglslation and the Corunlsslon took the
vlew that without thls leglslation 1t was unable to exeeute the budget ln
'{r''.)rdance wlth the will of Parll-ament as expressed in the budget declslons?
unfortunately thls has hapoened many tlmes ln the past, and happened
aqaln in 1979.
1 . The CommlssLon does not dispute the princlple that the budget is a
n(, cssary lega1 basis for the utlllzation of resources, and that money
may only be disbursed when a corresponding budgetary apprcprlatlon exlsts.
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Holyever, the Commission has repeatedly contested the fact that the budget
represents not only a necessary but rather a sufflcient legal basis for the
utillsation of approved aporopriations. ft tends to take the vlew that even
if aoproprl-ations are expressly made ln the budget they cannot be disbursed
in the abEence of supplementing tegislatlon from the councll.
33. In the oolnlon of the naJorlty of the Comrnlttee on Budgetary Control,
the European parllament ls unable to accePt thls legal vlew. Otherwlse the
budget woutd conseqluently lose any legalstgnlflcance in all those cases
where there \ras no back-up leglslatlon. In all such cases the budget
declslons themee,lves would be totally ignored, and the Councll oould,
outslde the budgetary procedure., in tts capaclty as leglslattve authorlty,
slrnply by dolng nothing block all those pollctes whlch the Parllament has
got the councll to accept Ln its capacity as part of the budgetary
authority durlng the budgetary Procedure. That thls ls not rlght can be
seen from the fact that, as ex5rlalned above, the Parllamentrs budgetary
powers could be undermlned ln those very areas where Parllament has the
last vrord. But another reason why lt cannot be accepted is that ln practlce
lt gives slmple lega1 provlslong enacted by the Councll hlgher standlng than
the budget l.tself. The budget should have the hlgher standJ.ng because, ln
contrast to the legal provislons enacted by the Councll, lt ls the result
of an extremely complex procedure, sometlmes requlrlng speciflc quallfled
najorltles, Ln whlch the commLsslon and both arms of the budgetary
authorlty, n€rmely the Parllament and the councll, take Part. The maJorlty
of members of the Commtttee on Budgetary Control find lt unacceptable that
part of the budget can tn fact be completely lnvalidated by the silnple
inacltvity of the Council ln the rest of its leglslatlve sphere' As the
conflict between the parllament and the Commisslon on thls polnt has now
been dragging on for several yearsr it ls the feeling of the maJority that
lt ls now tlme to ask the comnisslon for an unequivocal declarqtlon that
it ls prepared to recognlze the budget as the J-e9a1 basls for the
utlllzatlon of approprlations (5raragraph 15). As a eontributlon to a
constructive solutlon of the problem the Commlttee ProPoses in paragraph J'5
the settlng up of a mixed worklng party to work out wlth the conmission how
thls prlnclple can be apgJ.led ln indivldual cases ln the f,uture.
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As Parllanent does not of, course dispute the Council's right to regulate
the way apgroprlatlons are utillsed through supplementlng legislation,
and as at the same tlme it can no longer be accepted that certaln areas;
of the budget should be dlsregarcled both legalty ancl poJtttcalJy, utotho(l!'r
must be found for the eotutlon of thiE conflict. !{erely as an examplc
paragraph I6b puts forward for dlscusslon the posslblllty of introducing
tlme-Ilrnlts by the end of whlch the Cormlsslon must initlate and carry
out the pollcles adopted l-n the varlous tlnes of the budget, wlthout any
need for additlonal legal provlslons.
34. paragraph 1-7 goes on to proPose that the results of the work outlined
J.n paragragh 16 should then be dlscussed with the Councll, whlch bears,
through lts lnactlvltyr the nai.n resDonslblllt1' for the present
UnSatlgfac,torl, sltUatlOn. As, howevefl the l'orltrrment t'.1nnot I'or:(;e'fht!
councll to pass legal nrovlslons at all, lt must eoneentrste On the
Commlssion. fs lt possible for the Pafllament to lnslst thatr given certaln
condltlons, the approprlations ln the budget should be utllized even Lf
there ls no suppLementlng legal basls? ParlLament eould exert pressure by
refuslng to glve the Cornmlsslon a dlscharge, or by paselng a vote of
censure on the Coflunlsslon.
35. Paragrabh 18 repeats Parllamentts old demand that the prlnciple of
budgetary untty should at last be adopted, and all the flnanclal aetivltles
of the Communlty should be tncludecl ln t.he general budget. Irr partir-'ttlar,
borrowing and lendlng actlvltles and the operatlons of the European
Development Fund must at laEt be lncluded in the budget.
36. Of courser the under-utilLsation of resources again in 1979, ln
particular Ln respect of commitment aPProPriations (ParagraPh 20) j.s not
excLusLvely due to the above legal problems. lltre Corunittee on Budgetary
Control bel-ieves that ttre greateat eare muet be taken in future in the
budgetary procedure lteelf that only those resources ehould be entered in the
budget whlch can be expected to be utilised in the courae of the financial
year (paragraptr 22' see also paragraph 55).
III. The situatlon as reqards the aEsets and liabillties of the Europ,ean
Communitv
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37. Paragraphs 23 to 26 tef,,er to the statements to the Court of Auditors
that 1t once agaln nroved irnpossible In 1979 to obtain a reliable and
readtly understandable sunmary of the sltuatj.on regarding the comr,unityl s
assets at the end of the year. The Court of Audttors has proposed
practlcal solutLons to help to remedy thls situatlon. The Comnlttee on
Budgetary Control recouunends that these proOosals should be taken into
account in the future. Increased attentton should be 91ven in particular
(paragraoh 25) to the problem of the assessment ln the balance sheet of
budgetary aporoprlations carried forward. Paragraph 25 refers, flnally,
to the annoylng fact that no deftnlte l1ght has yet been shed on the lega1
situation regardlng stocks. In particular, the depreciation ln value of
stocks should be shown ln the balance sheet'
fV. Revenue
38 " tt w111 be recalted that thene vras a confliet in 1979 as to the legal
valldlty of the budget establlshed by the President of the European
Parllament for :l.g1g. The legallty of the budget htas doubted by some of
the Member States, and they were late ln paylng thelr contrlbutlons' As
this is far from belng a conflict of no more than hlstorlcal lmportance
(a slmllar conftlct ls pending at the Present tlme wlth regard to the
second supplementary budget for t98o and the 1981 budget), the committee
thoughtitapproprj.atetoexpresslyconfirmtheprinctplethatthe
budget can and rnust be carried out directly as soon as the President
of the paflliament has dectared the budgetary Proeedure to be closed
(paragranh s 27 Lo 29) . rn the comoromlse that was flnally reached
between the Dartles in 1979 the Corununity eventually agreed not to lnsist
on lnterest from the Member States whose payments n'ere late' The
conunlttee on Budgetary control belleves that although there may be some
potitlcal justlflcatlon for such renunclation in exceptlonal cases, as a
matter of principle the interest cLaims'arislng'from such sltuations
should :rot be waived as this reduces the communltyrs revenue
(paragraoh 30).
For other comments reference is made to the observatlons of the
l:apporteur on ttre other Parts.
v^ qAGGF, Gr.larantee Sectlcn
to
XrI. Development ald
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39. Reference is made to the obseryatlcns cf the rapporteurs, on theee
sections.
XIII European DeveloPment f'und
40. Slnce the rgport on this sectlon, the finEnelal regulatlon for the
Fifth European Development Fund has been passed by the Councl,l, without
any consultation of the Parllament. Paragraph 59 records that thls omlsslon
automatically renders the financlal regulation LnoPeratlve' The Corunittee
on Budgetary control dld not regard lt as its duty to put f,onrard ln lts
discharge rePort suggestions as to how tire EuropeEn Parliament should react
to thls vlolation tf lts rights. The cornrnLttee suggests that
Parllament should instruct lts approPrlate committees to draw uP Proposals
for further action in thls sltuation.
XIV. Adminlstrative expendlture and staff
4L. Partlcular reference is made here to paragrAphr'57. The denand that
offlcials should be held personally accountable ln the event of vLolations
of legal provlslons was consLdered by the Conunlttee on Budgetary Control
ln connection with one sgeclflc case. APart from this ease, the
Commlttee does however consider that thls reguLrement, which is tndeed
a natural one, should generally be upheld'
XV. Satellltes
and
xvr. Borrowtng and lendlng
42. Here reference Is agaln nlade to the Observatlons of the raPPorteur
on thls sectlon.
xVII. Concluding remarls
43. It Is in the nature of thlngs that erltteLsm should predomlnate ln
the annual report of the Court of Audltors a-d ln the rePorts of the
commlttee on Budgetary controJ-. These suPervisory bodles are naturally
less interested ln what has functloned well during the course of the
year and in any progress that has been made than in those areas where
dlfflcuLtles have emerged. Hovreverr PEecISeIy beeause these rePorts
are of greater lnterest to a wlder publlc, lt should not be oVerlooked
that in 1979 the activlty of, the CommLsston produced very posltlVe
results. The crttical conments contatned ln the annual report of the
Court of Auditors and in the dlscharge report of the ComnrLttee on Budgetary
Control should not be allowed to conceat the faet that the overaLl situatlon
is extrenely posltlve. 
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